The weakness of power
COLUMN
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By Pentti Sadeniemi
The United States occupation authority in Iraq seems to be undecided over whether or not it wants to act tough and violent, like Israel in its own occupied territories, or whether it prefers to try to patiently win over the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqis.
An occupier that wants to relinquish its power should choose the latter policy, while resorting to the former only on rare occasions, when there are no options. This is difficult in a country like Iraq that is full of conflicts, but it is certainly not impossible; the British seem to have succeeded at least reasonably well in their own occupation zone.
The worst alternative is unpredictable vacillation between those two types of policy. Nevertheless, this is the option chosen by the United States. It is one of the characteristics of the occupation of Iraq that make it almost impossible for an outsider to figure out what Washington is actually up to.
A brutal quadruple murder took place in Falluja, in the area of the Sunni Arabs. It is understandable that the occupying power did not feel it could refrain from reacting in some way or another. The reaction came, but it was quite incredible.
A US spokesman with the rank of a general insisted that the occupying power does not plan to blindly march into the city. He promised that the operation would be determined, precise, and overwhelming.
Then the US Marines marched blindly into the city, causing between 500 and 700 deaths. After apparently getting a bit of a fright themselves, the Americans stopped their operation and began to negotiate a truce. In other words, there was plenty of arbitrary destruction, but no results. The Americans’ prestige did not grow - it suffered.
In Najaf, a rebel trainee cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, barricaded himself inside a Shiite shrine after days of provoking the occupiers. The United States moved a significant proportion of its military firepower to the edge of the city, and gave orders to "either kill or capture" the violator of the peace. The Americans were reminded that the Shiites, who are a majority in Iraq, would not look kindly on the desecration of their holy city. At the time of writing, negotiations over a rather flimsy agreement are still going on.
After making disdainful threats, the occupiers’ restraint did not win it any goodwill or achieve any other benefit. As was the case in Falluja, the prestige and credibility of the United States received a blow in Najaf - something which could have been easily avoided with some consideration.
As if that were not enough, the Americans in Najaf imitated one of the most disgusting aspects of Israeli policy. It is not the role of the occupier to choose members of the population to be murdered on the basis of a simple administrative decision.
Undoubtedly al-Sadr himself does not hesitate to have people killed if they are in the way. He faces prosecution for just such a crime. However, this fact is no excuse for the actions taken by the United States. To justify the occupation of Iraq, Washington has invoked the blessings of democracy, the rule of law, and civil liberties - all values which should make such action impossible.
The everyday tactical mistakes in the occupation are more than matched by equally clumsy strategic mistakes in controlling the overall situation in Iraq. What is wrong with the Washington administration of George W. Bush? One would have to dig through political history with a lantern to find another group of powerful people that would have acted so consistently for the destruction of their own best purposes.
Before the invasion, Bush’s inner circle did everything it could to undermine the prestige and credibility of the United Nations. Now, a year later, the occupier wants nothing more than to borrow these very characteristics from the UN.
The invasion itself was described as an attack against international terrorism. Now few would have the temerity to deny that the breeding ground for international terrorism has expanded and deepened in the past year.
The conquest of Iraq was supposed to be a demonstration that the whole world would understand of the overall leadership position of the United States. A year later it is the most graphic example of the political and psychological limits of military superiority.
Explanations of the events will continue for a long time to come. With the help of a columnist’s licence - devoid of any responsibility - at least two come to mind: a disdain for facts and likelihoods typical of ideologues, and the illusion of omnipotence resulting from overwhelming military power. A combination of the two seems to have seduced the Bush administration into this massive project, whose costs and prospects for success it thoroughly miscalculated.
The ideology dictated that the Iraqis should be seen as a large oppressed nation which would, right after liberation, gratefully pool all of their energy for the reconstruction effort. If there were any budding doubts at all, they were not taken very seriously. The massive power of the United States was supposed to give enough room to correct the mistakes.
Of course US power remains great, and there really is a good deal of room to manoeuvre. Compared with the occupier, Iraq is a small country. However, as a political problem Iraq matches the size of the occupier. The United States can only devote as much money to the fulfilment of its mission - and sustain only as many casualties - as the voters are ready to accept. At the moment it seems that much money will have to be spent, and plenty of losses will have to be tolerated for a long time to come.
The longer the mission is continued on the basis of mistaken assumptions, unrealistic feelings of strength, and the denial of facts, the more difficult it will become. There have not been any signs of awakening awareness in the United States. The interests of both the United States and the rest of the world would require that the alarm-clocks start ringing.
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 22.4.2004
Helsingin Sanomat
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| 27.4.2004 - THIS WEEK |
 The weakness of power |
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