
President Kekkonen and his successful balancing act
Final volume of Kekkonen diaries tells of Soviet pressure
By Unto Hämäläinen
A week before Christmas Eve 1978 Helsingin Sanomat ruined Christmas for President Urho Kekkonen. The newspaper published an opinion poll, according to which 55% of the citizens considered Finnish foreign policy well taken care of. Three percent thought it was too West-oriented, while 34% thought it leaned too far to the East. The rest did not voice their opinion.
“When I read this, I was frightened. Things have gone seriously awry. Now that we are past the worst, people have started to ‘hold their heads up high’. My first thought was that I would resign the presidency in 1979. I have nothing to fight for, now that things have reached this stage of development,” Kekkonen wrote in his diary.
The message of the poll was clear: A significant number of citizens were dissatisfied with foreign policy even though Kekkonen had only recently been elected president with a vast majority – for the fifth time – and all of the parties had faith in the Paasikivi – Kekkonen line on foreign policy.
Kekkonen interpreted the result of the poll as “sympathy for the right wing increasing by leaps and bounds”, and feared a right-wing victory in the next parliamentary elections. If the right won, Kekkonen feared that he would have nothing left to do but exit the stage.
He did not abdicate, even though the right did win in the Parliamentary elections.
The fourth instalment of the Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat (“Diaries of Urho Kekkonen”) offers a clear answer to the question posed by Helsingin Sanomat at the time. The critical respondents were correct: Finland’s foreign policy had slipped too far eastward during Kekkonen’s last term in office.
The influence of the Soviet Union was personified by Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Stepanov and the strengthening of his influence over Finnish decision-making.
Professor Juhani Suomi , the editor of the diaries, suggests in the beginning of the book that Stepanov got “too close” to the president and that his “role as a late-born Finland-eater” troubled Kekkonen.
There is reason to believe Juhani Suomi's assessment. He was held an important post in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the end of the 1970s, and was a close friend and colleague of Keijo Korhonen .
Having worked as Foreign Minister and as Under-Secretary of State, Korhonen was Kekkonen’s most important political advisor, who supported the ageing president against Stepanov.
According to the diaries, Stepanov interfered directly in the president’s actions, government appointments, aspects of Finland’s official foreign policy, and the internal affairs of Finland’s political parties. He also sought to control Finland’s trade with the Soviet Union.
A couple of months before the Helsingin Sanomat poll, Stepanov encouraged Marshal Dimitri Ustinov to suggest a joint Finnish-Soviet military exercise.
The diary states that the Kremlin also backed the ambassador in this project, and appealed to Kekkonen by letter. Kekkonen rejected Ustinov’s suggestion and many other proposals, but not all proposals.
Luckily for the ageing president it was realised in Moscow that it would not serve the interests of the Soviet Union to pull the reins too tightly. Stepanov was withdrawn from his post in the summer of 1979. Kekkonen awarded Stepanov the Grand Cross of the Finnish White Rose.
A familiar man returned to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki: KGB general Viktor Vladimirov, who had greatly helped Kekkonen in the Presidential election of 1956.
Vladimirov calmed the situation down: there was no need to fear a revolution, or to hold joint military exercises. The definitions of neutrality remained unchanged.
Of course Vladimirov meddled in Finnish affairs, but he was tactful. Finns were quite used to it.
An example of this is was the replacement of Centre Party chairman Johannes Virolainen by Paavo Väyrynen in 1980.
About half a year before the party conference Kekkonen wrote about an agreement reached with Vladimirov.
“We agreed on four things: 1) Virolainen’s removal from the chairman’s spot. 2) Väyrynen to replace Virolainen.”
The two remaining issues were the selection of vice chairs and the party secretary, which were not resolved during the conversation.
When the decision had been made, Väyrynen received support for his campaign from both the Soviet Embassy and the President’s office – and he was chosen.
Behind the manoeuvre lay Kekkonen’s personal resentment towards Virolainen. The president equally disliked Ahti Karjalainen, and was appalled by his heavy drinking and reckless lifestyle.
If he stepped down from the presidency, Kekkonen calculated that Virolainen would win the Centre Party’s presidential nomination, and would receive votes also from the right. He wanted to prevent this from happening.
It has sometimes been suggested that Kekkonen would have broken his ties with the Centre Party in his last, radical years.
This is not true. Kekkonen operated inside the Centre Party to the very end and even voted for the party in elections.
In the parliamentary elections of March, 1979, he voted for Arja Kekkonen, a law student and candidate of the Centre Party’s youth organisation.
Kekkonen’s relationship with the political left varied. Social Democratic Party chairman Kalevi Sorsa and party secretary Ulf Sundqvist were the only Social Democrats to enjoy Kekkonen’s full approval.
Kekkonen had already decided at the beginning of 1975 that he would seek re-election in 1978. The term would last until 1984. The first request that Kekkonen run again came from the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
“If I am needed, I must be available. The people and circumstances are such that it is hard to tell how things would continue if I did not agree,” the president wrote on January 22 1975 – immediately after the courier of the Soviet Party leadership had received his affirmative response.
It is also quite clear that Kekkonen would not have let Mauno Koivisto be his successor if he could help it.
It is hard to find a positive remark about Koivisto in the diaries. Once Kekkonen and Koivisto discussed ideological questions.
“Koivisto was at my place. We discussed the social system. If the current one collapses or is destroyed, what would replace it? The Soc-Dems do not have any kind of program. The only ones that do are the Communists. But if you carefully open a door to the Social Democrats so that they can see part of a new society, they get scared. It is a tough price,” Kekkonen wrote in the end of 1976.
One can deduce that socialism - even a mild version of it - did not appeal to Kekkonen. However, this did not prevent him from working together with the Finnish Communist Party. Kekkonen persuaded the moderate majority faction of the Communists into the government and stifled their eagerness to organise strikes.
The only way Kekkonen could influence the hard-line minority faction of the Finnish Communist Party was by appealing to the Soviet Union. If deliveries of goods to the Soviet Union were in jeopardy, the leaders of the minority faction would agree to call off their strikes.
After lengthy consideration Kekkonen said in a speech at a trade union meeting in 1977 that he considered strikes to be an antiquated weapon. This was a bold statement at a time of constant industrial action.
Kekkonen’s estimate of the use of strikes proved to be accurate. After him the endless conflict between labour and capital was resolved in so decisively in capital’s favour that even now the only employees who dare strike are state and municipal employees.
Kekkonen tamed the National Coalition Party into being a loyal supporter. The new generation of conservatives, especially Ilkka Kanerva, received much understanding from Kekkonen. President Kekkonen tried to help establish relations between the youth organisation of the National Coalition Party and Soviet youth organisations. He was not successful in this.
The Soviet Communist Party did not want to associate with the National Coalition Party, and acted to make sure that it did not become a government party under Kekkonen’s rule.
This was a disappointment for Kekkonen, who would apparently have been glad to award Harri Holkeri and a few other conservatives with ministerial portfolios.
The period described in Kekkonen’s last diary was not a glorious chapter in the country’s political history.
In hindsight Kekkonen has been accused of being a despot in internal politics, and of bending to the will of the Soviet Union.
The President sought more power, but the Parliament and government could have stood up to the President. They were not able to do it.
The Soviet Union was given too much of a say at times, but Finland passed from Kekkonen to Koivisto as an independent Western country. Kekkonen bent, but he did not break.
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 22.9.2004
Previously in HS International Edition:
Diaries show President caught between rock and a hard place (30.9.2003)
Professor Juhani Suomi to switch from President Kekkonen to Koivisto (24.9.2003)
Second part of published diaries reveal details of President Kekkonen's private life (6.10.2002)
Journal entries indicate President Kekkonen considered resignation during Czech crisis of 1968 (1.10.2002)
Last instalment of Kekkonen diaries shows long-serving leader in his final years (22.9.2004)
UNTO HÄMÄLÄINEN / Helsingin Sanomat
unto.hamalainen@hs.fi
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President Kekkonen and his successful balancing act
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