Better foreign policy visibility

COLUMN

print this

By Kari Huhta
     
     The transitional period in foreign affairs in Europe is coming to an end. Last week the NATO summit in Bucharest, and the negotiations between Russia and the United States that came after it, gave much information about what was to come.
     In Bucharest the chatter in large EU and NATO meetings was noticeably different. This is significant news, when assessing what Finland also faces in foreign policy.
     Previously, noise in the meeting rooms and in the aisles were dominated by large West European languages, such as English, French, and German. Spanish and Italian fell slightly behind in the number of speakers, but not in volume.
     
The Slavic languages resonated loudly in Bucharest, complemented by other Eastern languages.
     The EU and NATO have not been mere Western organisations, whose only dimensions are north and south, for a long time.
     Expansion to the east began in the late 1990s, and has thoroughly changed the geographical and political map of both organisations. When approving as members nine countries from the sphere of interest of the former Soviet Union, as well as Slovenia from the former Yugoslavia, the organisations also handed over a large chunk of their power to the East.
     Although the northern dimension promoted by Finland is relatively unknown in other parts of Europe, the significance of the new eastern dimension has become quite clear.
     Nearly all new member states enthusiastically support the idea of continued eastern expansion. In the foreign policy of the Baltic Countries, it has a higher priority than cooperation with the Nordic Countries does.
     
Expansion has extended to countries which are further and further from the old West and its averages, and correspondingly closer to the heartland of Russia.
     Eastward expansion is significantly different than expansion in the south to the former Yugoslavia, or as far as the EU goes, to Turkey in the southeast. In all directions, the suitability of the applicant countries for membership is a problem, but in the east, there is also Russia.
     Enlargement has gone so far that there are no other countries in the east between the EU and NATO, and Russia other than Belarus and Ukraine. Belarus is the only country falling in the path of the enlargement route of the EU and NATO, which does not want to join either one.
     At the NATO summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that NATO's expansion into Ukraine, and Georgia "would be a direct threat to the security of my country".
     Putin's view, combined with the determination of the eastern member states of NATO and the EU to continue the eastward expansion, is a significant piece of information about the future direction of international politics. It has importance for the conditions under which Finland will practice its foreign policy in the near future.
     The significance is not linked with the chronic Finnish NATO debate. There is no benefit in linking it with Ukraine, which has a million Russians, a Russian naval base, and important Russian military industry, or Georgia, which has two pro-Russian separatist regions. No such connections are made in NATO either.
     
The dispute over eastward expansion is important for Finland, because it is important for the relations between Russia and the west in general, and will continue to cause friction in the future as well. The next time, NATO will seek unanimous support for the membership programmes of Ukraine and Georgia in December, and if necessary, at the next summit a year from now. Eastward enlargement will grow beyond NATO into an internal dispute within the EU. At that time, Finland will also have to take a clear stand on the matter. The present support for enlargement in principle will not be enough.
     The overall climate of foreign policy could be improving in spite of the dispute over enlargement. More cautiously positive statements about an overall desire to negotiate were noted in Bucharest than has been the case for a long time.
     At their meeting in Russia immediately after the Bucharest meeting, Putin and US President George Bush listed both disputes and negotiation goals. The list gives slight hope for progress in, among other things, negotiations on the conventional weapons treaty, frozen by Russia, and the strategic missile defence system being built by the United States.
     The list offers continuity, as Putin becomes Prime Minister a month from now, and Bush's term in office concludes in January next year.
     
As the transitional period recedes, visibility will improve. With respect to Russia, the transitional period has been something that should be written using quotation marks at the very least. In the United States, the number of candidates for Bush's successor is being reduced to two, and there are no radical changes of course on the European horizon.
     Europe's own setup is also relatively settled, even though of the old EU-NATO countries, Italy has elections at the weekend, and Germany will vote next year. At the same time, the ratification of the EU's new basic treaty is moving ahead.
     The great problems will not go away immediately. Finland, and the other countries, committed to taking part in the stabilisation of Afghanistan - something for which no target dates, or even target years have been set.
     The big maker of changes in Europe is France, which should augment its talk with action, when it holds the EU Presidency in the second half of the year. France's moves to bring the EU and NATO closer together are a challenge for the opponents of European military integration.
     
Finland was in transition itself in Bucharest, as it was getting a new foreign minister.
     During a year, the Finnish government has had to struggle fairly hard to make decisions on foreign affairs, which would suit the National Coalition Party, which controls both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, as well as the Centre Party of the Prime Minister, and the left-wing President. There have been results, but they have come slowly.
     The split in foreign policy became even wider when the pro-NATO Alexander Stubb replaced Ilkka Kanerva as Foreign Minister.
     In connection with the change, President Tarja Halonen reminded everyone in Bucharest about the authority of her office, and emphasised their importance for the continuity of foreign policy. Esko-Juhani Tennilä, the vice chairman of the Parliamentary group of the Left Alliance, defended the powers of the President using largely the same language a few days later. Tennilä made direct reference to the need to reject any further NATO projects.
     
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 9.4..2008


Previously in HS International Edition:
  Foreign Minister Stubb sees no change in Russian policy on NATO (9.4.2008)
  Vanhanen: NATO statements by Russia no cause for concern (8.4.2008)
  Foreign Affairs Committee chairman: Listen to Russia´s comments on NATO (7.4.2008)

KARI HUHTA / Helsingin Sanomat
kari.huhta@hs.fi