Bush II and Europe
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By Pentti Sadeniemi
There can be no real honeymoon between the United States and Europe at the beginning of the second Presidential term of George W. Bush because neither the political nor psychological conditions exist for such a move. Nevertheless most sensible people hope that the trans-Atlantic relationship might be brought onto a more sound basis after the bitter conflicts of the previous term.
One might imagine that the task would be relatively easy, because hardly anyone benefits from bickering, and there are plenty of common interests to deal with on both sides of the Atlantic.
One impediment to any thaw in relationships is, naturally, the aversion that the conservative Republicans around Bush feel toward "Europe" - a sentiment that is reciprocated. It is not possible to make the political world so mature, or so calculating that such emotional factors would not have an impact.
However, things would not look good even if the bickering were to end.
On the US side the main impediment would seem to be Iraq. That is where Washington simply has to expect more of the Europeans than what they are able to provide, for their own political reasons.
On this side of the Atlantic, in the EU, the most important impediments are the lack of structural capability and the lacking ability to lead. The Union remains stuck in its internal problems at least as long as the recent enlargement remains undigested and the constitutional treaty is not ratified. It would be possible to extend a hand to the United States even from the unfinished building site if the EU could find a common policy line, and if a credible leader or group of leaders could be found to serve as its mouthpiece. Nothing of the sort is on the horizon.
Iraq simply is such a violent place, and the United States holds so much responsibility in the country that it cannot relinquish it for the sake of fruitful cooperation. Washington is absolutely right when it says that a stable, and preferably democratic Iraq would be just as important a goal for the EU as it is for the United States. However, harping on this helps nothing; the countries of Europe cannot, even with the best of intentions, offer any effective help.
Armed rebellion in Iraq has escalated to such a degree that the multinational forces and a dispersed command could not cope with the situation even if Washington were ready to share its power of command. Iraq’s internal political situation is so sensitive and complicated that trying to control it would require that outsiders have tremendous sensitivity and understanding of local conditions.
Washington is not willing, and perhaps is no longer able, to transfer the highest responsibility, and thereby power, to others. Confidence in its military and political judgement has been eroded to the point that hardly anyone - with the exception of the special case of the British - can put resources or soldiers at the disposal of the United States. The voters in Europe would not allow it, even if other considerations were to favour such a step.
The only way that the situation could change would be if President Bush were to order a new public review of mistakes made in Iraq and replace the entire civilian leadership of the Pentagon. Everyone is free to guess how likely such an upheaval would be.
Until then, the stark metaphor presented by Secretary of State Colin Powell to President Bush involving a customer of a porcelain shop still applies: if you break something, you both have to pay for it, and keep the fragments yourself.
It is unlikely that even the Bush administration thinks differently. That leaves the possibility that the Iraq question will be kept separate from other areas of politics, and that progress will be sought in spite of it. In economics, in which the European Commission can speak on behalf of the whole EU, it is possible to try something - and to succeed. In political questions, the Union lacks a common voice.
Something of the kind might be found already before the Constitutional Treaty comes into effect, if the leader of some large EU country were sufficiently strong and could amass unofficial authority that is broad enough. Britain’s Tony Blair is too deep inside Bush’s pocket, France’s Jaques Chirac is too argumentative, and Germany’s Gerhard Schröder lacks the credibility for the task. There is no need to explain why Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi is out of the question.
In a recent column in the newspaper The Guardian, British historian and columnist Timothy Garton Ash recently hoped that a leader he called "Blairac might emerge, with three quarters of Tony Blair and one quarter Jaques Chirac. Looking from the continent, an even 50/50 would be better, but neither combination is likely to emerge.
The best that one might propose in this deadlock would be if a coordination group comprising the smaller countries of the EU. Spain, Poland, the Nordic Countries, and Benelux could show the way, if they would combine their abilities and their strengths for a balanced transatlantic dialogue. However, this is only a theoretical idea, whose possibilities to become reality do not awaken high hopes.
As long as there is no common voice and no common leadership in the EU, Washington does not even have to succumb to the temptation of a "divide and conquer" policy toward the EU. That is what is being offered from this side of the Atlantic, with vast variety within the EU in attitudes toward the United States and its President. Or should we demand of Washington that it snub its best friends in the name of European integration?
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 18.11.2004
PENTTI SADENIEMI / Helsingin Sanomat
pentti.sadeniemi@hs.fi
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| 23.11.2004 - THIS WEEK |
 Bush II and Europe |
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