COMMENTARY: The international emergency number is 56-68-79-08

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By Unto Hämäläinen
     
      When the current EU Englargement Commissioner Olli Rehn was a fresh-faced Finnish student politician-in-embryo in the 1980s, a Soviet politician asked him during some bilateral discussions if he happened to know what the international emergency number was.
      Rehn confessed he did not.
      “It’s 56-68-79", said the Soviet politician with a broad grin.
     
Next Thursday, all of Europe will stop for a moment to recall the events that took place precisely 40 years ago.
      In the early hours of the morning of August 21st, 1968, Warsaw Pact troops began the occupation of Czechoslovakia, rapidly taking Prague and rounding up the leaders of the Central Committee of the Czech Communist Party, under First Secretary Alexander Dubcek.
      The anniversary of the occupation will be marked this year under an exceptionally dark cloud.
      Russian military actions in Georgia brought back to mind all the digits of that telephone number Rehn had heard: Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and Afghanistan 1979.
     
All three events had an impact on the Finland of the time: Moscow tightened its leash on Helsinki, as the Soviet Union sought to weaken Finland’s position of neutrality, and to hamper the building of economic ties with the West.
      In all quiet, the Finns might now be asking themselves whether the sequence of numbers might be expanded to include 2008.
     
The Soviet interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan were ideological military expeditions.
      The USSR was implementing the tenets of the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine", the foreign policy thinking according to which other socialist countries should intervene - using military force if need be - in the case that another country was abandoning the socialist path.
      “When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.”
     
That was then, this is now. Russia is not a socialist country, so it did not justify its military actions in Georgia on ideological grounds, but on national ones.
      It wished to protect the beleaguered Russian minority in Georgia, in the secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
      It is a pertinent question to ponder, whether what we are seeing emerge in Russian international relations is a “Medvedev Doctrine” or “Putin Doctrine”, the thrust of which is that Russia will intervene - using military force if need be - in the internal affairs of another country if that country’s Russian minority gets into difficulties.
     
If such a doctrine really has come into effect, then 2008 can be added to that grim series of numbers.
      The consequences may well be felt in other European countries that have a significant ethic Russian minority, possibly as a hangover from the Soviet era.
      We saw signs of this in Estonia already in the spring of last year, when the Estonians and the ethnic Russians in the Estonian population clashed in Tallinn over the contentious relocation of a Soviet World War II memorial.
     
The reactions among Western countries to the Russian incursion into Georgia look on the surface much the same as those in 1956 over the Hungarian Uprising, in 1968 at the suppression of the Prague Spring, and in 1979 when Soviet troops went into Afghanistan.
      The Soviet Union used brute force in their occupation and subjected the neighbouring country to the power of Moscow.
      Those in the occupied lands hoped for military help from the West, but it was not forthcoming.
      Western powers condemned the occupations, helped people who were fleeing the countries concerned, and exerted pressure on Moscow, but nobody took up arms or scrambled the warplanes.
     
It was said cynically in the West that the Soviets could do much as they liked in their socialist “backyard”, just as long as they didn’t go attacking the countries of the West.
      In this respect the world has changed - at least a little bit. Leaders of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union travelled promptly to Georgia and set about negotiating a peace settlement.
      Not even the most barking-mad observer would have imagined in December 1979 that the then Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Paavo Väyrynen would have flown to Kabul and started to act as an intermediary in the Afghanistan conflict.
     
The ministry headed by Väyrynen contented itself with issuing a short bland press statement that reported Finland was following the events.
      And that was it, even though the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, setting up the OSCE, had been held in Helsinki in August 1975.
     
Of course, the comparison with 39 years ago is not altogether an honest one, in the sense that Alexander Stubb’s prominent role in matters in Georgia derives not from his being Finland’s Foreign Minister, but because he is currently (until December 31st) the Chairman-in-office of the OSCE.
      In any event, Stubb’s high-profile role as mediator and peacemaker brought the fighting in Georgia close to the Finnish consciousness.
      The conflict could also have far-reaching implications for Finland’s foreign and security policy.
     
When Stubb reported on his mission to Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee last Thursday, the MPs also spent some time discussing the influence the war in Georgia might have on future Finnish moves.
      The divide that emerged was predictable enough.
      The supporters of NATO membership saw that membership should now be seriously considered. Those opposed to joining the alliance gave the firm assurance that at least right now was not the time for such consideration.
      The debate is certain to rumble on through the autumn, for the government and President Tarja Halonen are at present putting the finishing touches to a report on defence and security policy that will be presented to Parliament in the fall.
      A Parliamentary group of MPs from different parties already expressed their own opinion back in June.
      The eight parties represented in the house gave their unanimous view that Russia was not - in June, that is - a military threat to Finland.
      A significant increase in budget appropriations for the Finnish Defence Forces was not deemed necessary.
     
The report took no new stand on NATO. Finland does not belong to the military alliance, but the MPs took a very positive view of military collaboration within the EU and among the countries of the Nordic region.
      The members felt that Finland should take a permanent role in EU crisis management and be ready to accept military help and to give it to other EU member-states if necessary.
     
It is likely that Parliament's position will not change dramtically in the course of the autumn. But it is possible that some new nuances may be included in wording of the report on foreign and security policy.
      The atmosphere in Finland, too, is changing.
      Just under a year ago, when Defence Minister Jyri Häkämies announced in Washington that Finland's geographical location brings three main security policy challenges: "Russia, Russia, and Russia", he was practically lynched in the market square back home.
      Were Häkämies to deliver the same speech today, it would not provoke such strong reactions.
     
In historical terms, Finland is now faced with a new and challenging situation.
      In 1956, 1968, and 1979, the nation's leaders really did not have much alternative than to hunker down and remain as quiet as a mouse in their own foxholes.
      Now Finland's position is rather different. Parliament, the president, and the government can choose between two alternatives: either to join NATO or continue along the old path. And this is also well understood in Moscow.
      Russia's most important objective "in the Finland file" is that Finland should remain outside NATO. If Moscow were now to start exerting pressure on Finland, it would also be pushing an EU-member around.
      The fear in Moscow is also that then the Finns would rapidly exercise their option of joining NATO.
     
In domestic politics, too, the current situation is an interesting one.
      The National Coalition Party are broadly in favour of applying to join NATO.
      And yet the NCP does not determine Finland's line on this issue, for that falls to the main government party, the Centre, and the main opposition grouping, the Social Democrats.
      Together these two have a majority in foreign policy and the clout that goes with it. The majority of their supporters are against NATO entry, and hence the parties' leaders have their hands tied.
     
At the same time, the Centre Party and the SDP are not completely of one mind on NATO. Within both parties there are supporters of membership, and the two parties are watching each other's movements like hawks. If one slides towards NATO, expect the other to make a move, too.
      This position is likely to remain largely stalemated at least until 2011 or 2012, when there will be elections for a new Parliament, government, and (in 2012) a new President of the Republic.
      Then at the latest will be the time for a new appraisal of where we stand.
     
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 17.8.2008


Previously in HS International Edition:
  Vanhanen: South Ossetia crisis will affect next national defence report (19.8.2008)
  Politicians: Finnish policy unaffected by Caucasus crisis (13.8.2008)

UNTO HÄMÄLÄINEN / Helsingin Sanomat
unto.hamalainen@hs.fi