Conscription army - strategic necessity, or fixation of national identity?
COLUMN
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By Erkki Pennanen
In what respect does Finland differ most from other European countries? We are getting to be the only country which continues to build its national defence on a conscription-based army of hundreds of thousands of reservists, with the aim of defending the country’s entire massive territory on our own against even a large-scale attack.
The defence policy part of the government’s security policy report sparked much less debate in Parliament and in the media than the foreign policy component. During the preparation of the report, debate actually centred around a single detail: the external pressures to give up infantry land mines as quickly as possible so that Finland might join the Ottawa Treaty.
In the dispute, the Ministry of Defence, with staunch support from public opinion, rolled over the President and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Infantry land mines were seen as such an important part of defence, that giving them up would be out of the question without expensive systems to replace them, and that would require some time.
The report was criticised in the committee phase for excessively glossing over factors of uncertainty concerning Russia. According to scenarios of threats presented in the report, the Defence Forces must prepare to repulse an attack that begins with a strategic strike aimed at occupying Finnish territory. The purpose of such an attack could be to "take hold of areas that are crucial for the aims of the war".
The report did not stop to ponder how unlikely such a model might be. It has been seen as one scenario, and it is along those lines that Finland is required to develop its national defence.
Finland wants to be "militarily non-allied" with a credible national defence. With that as a starting point, it is easy to justify the idea that Finnish defence needs to be based on an extensive regional defence. Previously it required the training of an army of nearly half a million, and currently 350,000 men for wartime conditions, which is possible only with a system of universal conscription.
When Green League chairman Osmo Soininvaara had the temerity to propose that Finland should train only a part of each age group for military duty, Defence Minister Seppo Kääriäinen responded by asking what part of Finland the Greens would leave undefended.
The Swedes, who have removed the idea of an attack on Swedish territory from their scenarios, are told with some sarcasm that it is well and good for them to sit and calculate probabilities behind Finland’s back.
Finland’s army of 350,000 soldiers will be larger in size than the armed forces of the other Nordic Countries and the Baltic States combined. It is virtually a national taboo to encourage discussion over why Finland would need such a large military in the next decade, when all other countries aim to make do with much less.
Perhaps one has to live abroad long enough to be able to see how deeply wars and the threat from the East have affected our national identity, and how they continue to do so. Where in Europe (except Russia) are war movies a mandatory part of the television programming of the national holiday?
The Winter War, the spirit of the Battle of Tali-Ihantala, the novel The Unknown Soldier and its two film versions, are central elements of Finnish national identity today as well. These also include universal conscription, as was emphasised in a recent interesting historical and sociological report drafted for the Ministry of Defence by Kari Laitinen.
Images of the enemy are important in the establishment and formation of national identity. In Finland, the threat from the East has been both myth and reality from generation to generation. It continues to have a very strong influence - regardless of whether the threat is real or imagined.
Even in the defence policy report, the threat from the east is seen to be real at least to some extent, albeit that there is some reticence in drawing attention to it. A person who feels that the threat from the East is a relic of bygone days is easily labelled as either naive or a Russophile.
Fear of Russia is nevertheless more in the realm of mythology than reality. If the threat from Russia were really seen as a danger, then Finns would hardly feel that they could afford to be so opposed to joining NATO. Membership in NATO would solve the security problem at one go, but it would mean falling into line with the United States - as the people see it.
NATO membership has much support in the top echelons of the Defence Forces for many reasons, but not as Finland’s defence solution. The Chief of Defence, Admiral Juahni Kaskeala, has emphasised that Finland would want to take care of the defence of its own territory itself even if it joined the alliance. Even as a NATO member, Finland would keep its conscription-based reservist army that is large by European comparisons.
The advantages of a conscription army compared with a professional army appear indisputable in Finnish conditions as long as the overall eagerness for national defence remains high, and as long as military service is seen as a civic duty. Admiral Kaskeala has publicly expressed pride that the conscription army in Finland also guarantees high quality, as the system brings university students of all fields into the military.
The Finnish system is very cost-effective when counting the per capita costs for each soldier in the reserves. But when will it be seen as an exaggeration of self-defence for an EU country of five million inhabitants to continue to see a need for an army of 350,000 men ready for war?
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 30.3.2005
ERKKI PENNANEN / Helsingin Sanomat
erkki.pennanen@hs.fi
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| 5.4.2005 - THIS WEEK |
 Conscription army - strategic necessity, or fixation of national identity?
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