FIVE YEARS ON: Fears of the first strike on the cosy Nordic nest

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By Jukka Harju
     
      There are no signs of a threat that would directly affect Finland, but the situation is being monitored.
     
      This was the gist of the message that came out of the Security Police (SUPO) headquarters in Helsinki's Ratakatu after the terror-strikes in New York City five years ago, and much the same form of words was heard after the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and last year's carnage in the London Underground.
      At the same time, Finland and international terrorism have nevertheless come closer together in other ways: in the past five years new terrorism clauses have been written into Finnish law, the readiness of the police and other authorities has been stepped up, and SUPO itself has acquired its own anti-terrorism unit, which has in turn improved intelligence-gathering.
      The police now have a legally-mandated right, if push comes to shove, to call upon the Finnish Air Force to scramble an F-18 Hornet to shoot down a commercial airliner that terrorists have hijacked.
      These are big changes, if there are no signs of any direct threat.
     
There is a lengthy pause before Paavo Selin, the head of the SUPO anti-terror unit, offers a response to the question of Finland's role in fighting al-Qaeda terrorism.
      "Yes, we do need to make some adjustments here. We cannot underestimate the significance of these things. We have had a number of really important measures taken", comes the evasive reply at last.
      "It is not widespread or on a large scale, but there are people living in Finland who are clearly involved in international terrorist circles."
      In Finland, as elsewhere, the main emphasis is on Islamic extremists.
     
But Selin is not going to be drawn any further: talking too much might hamper ongoing investigations. Then again something has to be said, perhaps in order to scotch the idea of Finland's somehow still being a kind of Scandinavian Shangri-la out of the reach of all things malign.
      This week, for instance, saw a terrorist shadow flitting past very close to the door.
      The security police in Denmark arrested nine young men, mostly Danish nationals of Muslim extraction, on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks. The men had been under surveillance for some time. According to Danish officials, those in custody had been planning an attack in Denmark.
      The Danish incident was yet another example of the fact that Europe has now become one of the most important front-line regions in the fight against terrorism.
     
Counter-terrorism activities are for the most part not very different from the police work that is done, for instance, in investigating international drug-trafficking rings. There is a lot of talking to people, much running down of tip-offs of one kind or another, surveillance - and phone-tapping.
      Just over a year ago, the Finnish police were granted the right to tap the phone-calls of persons believed to be preparing terrorist acts, in order to prevent a crime from being committed, even if no crime had taken place as such. Over on the traditional crime-prevention side, the introduction of electronic surveillance and legal phone-tapping in the 1990s proved to be a major technological breakthrough.
      SUPO has also been given funding to allow where necessary for interpreters to translate into Finnish the information that has been recorded.
     
There is nevertheless a considerable difference between terror-related crime and traditional crime in Finland, at least until now: thus far there has apparently been no official investigation opened on any acts linked to terrorism.
      Selin concurs: "We have not yet encountered the sort of incident that would have led to a formal criminal investigation", he says.
      And this despite the fact that electronic surveillance - in the form of wire-tapping - has already been used. SUPO should have had some kind of evidence or justification for having sought a court order to listen in. Selin notes only that there have been cases where "matters were explored from A to Z."
      "We would open a formal case immediately if there were the grounds for it, but we don't want three-ring-circus preliminary investigations. There have to be the proper grounds to go to work."
     
The moment may not be that far ahead when something concrete is revealed.
      "Not so very long ago it was possible to say with some confidence that terrorists come from camps a long way away. Now the discussion is coming around to the fact that they are in fact boys and girls from much closer to home, who are taking part in plans to blow up themselves and a huge number of other people."
      The most serious suspicions in Finland have been associated with a grouping that is believed to have a plan for a terrorist act, says Selin. SUPO has also taken an interest in the flows of funding that may or may not have some links with this venture.
      There is also empirical evidence that those individuals who have been under surveillance also know that SUPO has its eye on them.
     
Within Europe, the attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center persuaded police forces rapidly to close ranks and upgrade their counter-terrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing. An essential part of this work is in the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG), pooling the resources of intelligence and security forces across Europe. SUPO is the Finnish representative.
      Then came the Madrid bombings of March 2004, in which nearly 200 met their deaths on morning commuter trains. The spectre of al-Qaeda terrorism had come to Europe, and this prompted further strengthening of the EU's counter-terrorism resources.
      Now for instance the Union's Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) follows the global security situation around the clock. Finland has been more of a receiver of information than a supplier in the intelligence sharing process.
     
"Without the information we get relayed through international contacts we would not have the wherewithal to handle the domestic counter-terrorism tasks. We'd be all alone in the cold", says Selin.
      "Through the international network of security agencies we get key information on terrorist groups and cells, on their members, their activities, and their modus operandi."
     
There is nonetheless a limit to the sort of key information that is freely passed around. Selin became aware of the latest terrorist plot exposed in Britain in August through media reports of the arrests, just as the rest of us did.
      Finland has not come under pressure from any other countries, according to Selin, even though the common need for information is enormous. The national interest dictates which groups - and Selin uses this word often - that SUPO decides to keep its eye on.
      Selin regards the recent revelations and arrests in London and elsewhere as a milestone: the case proved just how vital successful intelligence gathering is in heading off a terrorist plot.
     
According to the British authorities, the terrorists' plan was to blow up as many as ten transatlantic flights out of London.
      The number of victims would have rivalled that of the 2001 atrocities, and all the evidence would have gone conveniently to the bottom of the Atlantic.
      "If it had come off, a strike like this could have stopped the world in its tracks", Selin says.
      The British Sunday broadsheet The Observer was able to disclose details soon after the scheme was foiled, revealing how British and Pakistani security forces had got on the trail of the planned attack.
      One of the most important tip-offs came from inside the British Muslim community, and as a result of this information the authorities set about monitoring the telephone traffic of those under suspicion. This sketched out a picture of a network in which certain individuals had a more significant role than others.
      At much the same time, information came to light on e-mail addresses of some of the suspects, and the authorities began to follow the traffic through these addresses. The next stage involved phone-tapping, the bugging of apartments and houses used by suspects, and the planting of electronic tracking devices in vehicles.
     
All these methods are ones that the National Bureau of Investigation (Finland's central criminal police arm) has used with no little success against organised crime in recent years.
      In practice they are have also been the only means of getting a handle on what are known in police slang as "stiff cases", in other words those suspicions of major crimes that are still only in the intelligence phase and which require that the police throw in their entire arsenal of resources.
      "There is no way of promising that Finland can be completely at ease, because we have stiff cases of our own, too", says Selin.
     
On the basis of what Paavo Selin says - and even what he leaves unsaid - Finland may yet experience the same sort of scenes that left suburban Londoners scratching their heads in August.
      An unmarked police forensics van swings into the drive of the neighbouring detached house and unloads a team of white-overalled investigators who go over the place with a fine toothcomb, in search of evidence of the ingredients to make some improvised explosive device or other.
      "Is it already a significant phenomenon that terrorists are seeking reasons for their actions from their own locale?" asks Selin.
      "Somebody else can probably offer a better answer to that one than us police types."
     
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 10.9.2006


Previously in HS International Edition:
  Worldwide terror alert causes delays at Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (11.8.2006)

JUKKA HARJU / Helsingin Sanomat
jukka.harju@hs.fi