Finland's solitary struggle

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By Pentti Sadeniemi
     
      No matter how true it is that Finland cannot change geography, or flee its effects, those effects are not exactly the same from one age to another. The beginning of wisdom is to recognise the facts, but in international reality there are other facts than the ones that can be read straight from an atlas.
      The world changes. It also changes in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean, even though the shapes of the coastlines remain the same.
      Those on both sides of the Atlantic who think about international politics for a living also try to visualise great global changes, such as the relatively significant growth of Asia, and especially China. It is expected to gradually lead to a weakening, and possibly even the end of the hegemony of the "West".
      The notion is by no means new, but in the interim, it was in fashion to see the new century from two completely different angles. It was thought that the democratic system is moving from one victory to another because it is the most sensible of all ways to organise a society. Others see an entire century of the lone hegemony of the United States, mainly stemming from Washington's overwhelming might.
     
However, the expansion of democracy stopped in the world. China retained its dictatorship and Russia turned its back on democracy. The United States marched into Iraq to demonstrate its military superiority, but ended up demonstrating the narrow limits of its effectiveness.
      The European Union is trying to get its new treaty into force, which is supposed to make it a more significant player in the areas of foreign and security policy as well. The United States is choosing a new president. It is hoped that he or she would guide Washington back to the position of leadership in the Western world that predecessor George W. Bush was not able to maintain.
      It is quite common to suggest that both the EU and the United States will be partially successful. It is also thought that it will not be possible to avoid a certain competition between them, but that the bickering will not be allowed to get out of hand. If the relative significance of the "West" dwindles, an internal understanding within the Western cultural sphere will be all the more important.
     
When Finland's national position as a northeastern border state of the EU is examined from the three separate horizons of Brussels, Paris, and Washington, one gets a somewhat disconcerting impression. The nation is grumbling on its own, as it were. It is engaged in an internal monologue, both from its slightly remote position, and from its desire to be somewhat less of an outsider than before.
      Finland produces reviews of its security policy environment, which it then avoids evaluating. It is careful not to glance across the border to Russia, of whose development in recent years it is not so much ignorant, but rather merely prefers not to discuss.
      The past and geography weigh on Finnish thinking like a lead overcoat. It is no wonder that Finland's lonely struggle is something that other Western countries cannot be bothered to follow, and certainly not understand.
      In the bygone years of the Cold War, the defining characteristic of Finland's foreign policy position was a unique combination of the Western system and Eastern dependence. As Finland avoided occupation in the Second World War, the Finnish system remained democratic. As the war was lost, Finland was left in the sphere of interest of the communist great power.
     
Finland came out of the contradictory situation intact, although the price was higher than what people now willingly remember.
      Governments could not be formed on the basis of internal criteria alone. The nurturing of commercial and cultural relations confronted political obstacles. Pressure and self-censorship limited freedom of speech.
      The end of the Cold War also brought an end to this unhealthy situation. Geography did not change, but geography is not the only geopolitical reality. Membership in the European Union linked Finland politically where it belonged culturally.
     
The members of the European Union visualise themselves - quite correctly in fact - both economically and politically as a community of values. The EU is an ambitious project of constitutional democracies.
      Integration has moved forward in an uneven manner, and rapid enlargement has made it more difficult. However, there is already plenty of common legislation. Finnish politicians and experts are sitting on common state bodies. Freedom of movement and of practicing one's profession are everyday reality. Many member states, including Finland, have a common currency.
      To supplement economic and political integration, foreign and security policy integration are needed, but a number of reasons have slowed down the development, and continue to do so. The idea of a common defence is ripening even more slowly.
      First of all, security policy and defence are the most key areas of national sovereignty; it is not easy for anyone to move them into new common institutions. Second, effectively and reliably taking care of them requires concentrated decision-making processes, which are slow to build up.
      Third, the great common organisation of the defence of Western Europe has long been NATO, which has as its members 21 of the European Union's 27 member states. That is a fact that the Cold War left behind, but NATO is no mere relic of the Cold War. Countries are seeking to join it, not leave it.
      In the development of the EU's security and defence policy, it is not possible to avoid the question of NATO as a part of it. As the United States is the leading country in NATO, the NATO question inevitably includes the question of the position of the United States in Europe.
      Those questions should not actually be difficult. They would have been even easier if they did not have so much prestige, national sensitivities, and posturing mixed in.
     
Let us start from two basic facts. Not a single EU member state has proposed that the United States should pull out of Europe. France has expressed the wish that Washington's voice would decline in favour of that of the Europeans - that is, France - but that is all. Even Paris, under the leadership of its new President Nicolas Sarkozy, seeks to increase its cooperation with the United States.
      There is no point in the European Union developing its common defence without Britain, which is militarily one of the top countries in the EU. There is no point in waiting for Britain to agree to a common EU defence without maintaining a strong bond with the United States.
      Recognising this fact seems to be one of the important motivations of Sarkozy's new politics. Furthermore, the British are not at all alone in their attitude.
      The East European countries which broke away from the sphere of power of the former Soviet Union are the most devout defenders of the idea that NATO is indispensable. Both their fear of Russia and trust in the United States may be exaggerated, but the EU cannot ignore their views either.
      NATO will not be a mere underling of the United States, and this has never even been a goal set out by Washington. The boisterous unilateralism of Bush's first term did not manifest itself in the bullying of NATO, but rather in ignoring it. His predecessor will certainly want more especially in Afghanistan. Even then negotiations and voluntary cooperation is the only sensible way to go.
     
What makes the position of Finland so separate and special that the solution arrived at by a great majority of EU member states would not suit us? Certainly not the deep sense of community with the other non-NATO members of the EU, because the national situation of each one of them differs from that of each of the others. Sweden is certainly not a good point of comparison, as gladly as Finns like to emphasise the similarities in foreign policy thinking between Stockholm and Helsinki.
      Naturally, one special characteristic is the long common history and the complicated relationship with the neighbour Russia. Its effect here is seen far more frequently in people's thoughts than in public speeches. Its precise security policy impact is not always so very easy to approach.
      How does Russia's recent development affect Finland's security policy position, or does it have any effect at all? It cannot be in any way sufficient to first put forward a rhetorical question about Russia's "military threat" and then answer that no such threat exists.
     
We can get further if we examine two quite distinct questions. One involves Russia's political culture. The other concerns the stability of the state system that President Vladimir Putin recently pulled out of his sleeve.
      Russia's development toward constitutional democracy, which began in a promising manner, has suffered a clear defeat in recent years at the hands of a much older, and apparently very vibrant characteristic of the country's political culture. These have nothing to do with constitutionality or democracy.
      In this series of events the most astonishing characteristic has not been has not been the repression of freedom of speech and assembly, or that of the rule of law, but rather how calmly the Russian population has accepted the chipping away of its rights.
      The border between Finland and Russia has remained open to trade, travel, and cultural exchange to a fortunate degree. The border between political cultures is ripping open into a deep chasm. There is nothing at all that can be done about that development in Finland.
      Putin chose a successor to himself - Dmitri Medvedev. At the same time he made it clear that he will retain his own political influence - apparently from the post of Prime Minister.
      Russian voters will accept this arrangement as well without much problem. Putin has actually been congratulated on the way that he has managed to secure political stability, in contrast to the frightening upheavals of the 1990s.
     
What kind of stability is this? The highest political power of a big state has been left completely dependent on a single personal relationship.
      Putin has been an absolute leader and Medvedev has been a loyal follower. Now Medvedev is being made the head of state. The formal power relationship will be turned into the opposite of the personal relationship. The world is being told that their strong friendship will prevent all possible friction and all misunderstandings. It appears as if the probabilities of history, politics and psychology are being removed from office in Russia.
      What if the experiment does not succeed? Where is the political safety net when institutions have been allowed to become nearly paralysed? Who will be the right referee if the duo at the peak of power no longer pull in the same direction? The Putinesque stability of Russia is of a very insecure and conditional variety.
      That can also be seen as a lesson from the years of the Cold War. It is a considerable additional argument in favour of seeking membership in NATO as well. Perhaps not a very urgent one, or one that operates alone, but a reason nonetheless.
     
And what are the arguments against it? The European Union is the most appropriate economic, political, and cultural home for Finland. A decision in its behalf was made years ago.
      The EU is building a common security and defence policy, in which Finland is enthusiastically involved. It has become quite clear that the NATO defence alliance, and through it, the United States, have an important and lasting role in that cooperation. This is the case because most of the EU's member states want it to be so, and none are seriously opposed to it. Nobody really wants the United States to disappear behind the ocean. Finland's own declared view is the same.
      What remains on the other side of the balance is hardly more than a lack of expertise, election fears, or left-social democratic ideology. Quite a few voters suffer from the first of these, politicians who depend on the voters suffer from the second, and the third affects people who once made the issue into an identity for themselves.
     
It is a very unholy trinity, but its combined strength should not be underestimated in today's Finland. People were wondering in Brussels quite recently why so few Finnish politicians have even bothered to visit NATO headquarters to add to their knowledge. One would hope that at least the Members of Parliament would open their eyes and be more diligent.
     
Pentti Sadeniemi, a long-term editorialist and international affairs columnist at Helsingin Sanomat, is retiring at Easter. He recently spent two weeks in Paris, Brussels, and Washington. The preceding is the second of a two-part article written on the basis of the meetings he held during his trip. The first appeared among our weekly features last week (see link).
     
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 9.3..2008


Previously in HS International Edition:
  Europe and United States reaching out to each other again (8.3.2008)

PENTTI SADENIEMI / Helsingin Sanomat
pentti.sadeniemi@hs.fi