How far will Russia go?

By Leo Pugin
     
      The dispute over the status of South Ossetia, which expanded into an open war two weeks ago, has moved ahead completely under Russian control from the very beginning.
      Georgia’s decision to move on the separatist province of South Ossetia can be seen as a miscalculation at the very least - even as outright folly.
      Russia’s reaction shows, nevertheless, that Moscow was waiting for the right moment to punish Georgia and its pro-Western President Mikhail Saakashvili.
     
The message that was conveyed to the West was also clear. Now, finally, Russia needs to be taken into account in international security arrangements, and it will no longer look on from the sidelines as former Soviet republics flirt with NATO.
      According to many intelligence sources, including those of Britain, Russia had planned and practised its Georgia operation for two years.
      In July Russia organised large military exercises in the Caucasus. When the exercises were over, the forces and equipment stayed in place, and were available for use against the Georgians at short notice.
     
Russia has not left any doubt that a change in leadership in Georgia would be to its liking.
      By pushing deep into Georgia, and by destroying the infrastructure, Moscow hopes to cause public support for Saakashvili to collapse.
      According to Stratfor, a research institute which specialises in American intelligence analysis, everything was planned in the headquarters of the Russian security service FSB.
     
As Russia was ready to go as far as it did “to secure its own citizens”, the question invariably comes to mind: what is Russia’s next move?
      Former President Vladimir Putin, who became Prime Minister last spring, has said that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical disaster of the century.
      President Dmitri Medvedev, who was left in Putin’s shadow during the crisis in the Caucasus at the latest, has also resorted to tough rhetoric.
      “If someone thinks that he can kill our citizens with impunity - that is something that we will never allow. Everyone who tries to do something like that will face a crushing blow. We have all possibilities for that - economic, political, and military”, Medvedev said early in the week.
     
The strong men of Moscow, many of whom grew up like Putin with the Soviet security service, the KGB, and with its successor the FSB, see Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union.
      In the West, the time that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union was seen as a relatively good phase of development, and the weak presidency of Boris Yeltsin was also used for the promotion of Western interests.
      Russia was seen as a friend and a cooperative partner.
      Many Russians saw things differently. Strobe Talbott, who served as Undersecretary of State under Bill Clinton, has made some pertinent comments: when others feel secure, Russia feels insecure.
      The present leaders in the Kremlin are annoyed by the westward slide of certain neighbours.
      As men of the “old covenant”, they also felt that it was extremely humiliating that the United States and the other Western countries bypassed Russia when the European security map was redrawn after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
     
The biggest Russian minority is in Ukraine.
      Relations between Russia and Ukraine are strained by Kiev’s pro-Western stance, for instance, and the Russian naval base on the Crimean Peninsula, the lease agreement on which expires in 2017.
      Few believe that Russia would be ready to take up arms to defend its interests in Ukraine.
      Nevertheless, it will continue to criticise the present leadership, and is using the Russian population in Ukraine to shore up its policies.
     
Moldova is in a situation similar to that of Georgia.
      The status of Transnistria, which is populated by Russians, remains unresolved.
      Moldova wants the area for itself, but Transnistria is loyal to Russia.
      If Russia recognises South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Transnistrian question will certainly become more active.
      There are also strong Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Relations between Russia and Estonia in particular have been at a low ebb because of last summer’s military statue dispute.
     
The NATO membership of the Baltic countries is seen as a serious setback in the Kremlin, but it is unlikely that Russia will try to test the resilience of NATO’s Article 5 in practice.
      Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has significant oil reserves, which the Kremlin would prefer to see flow via Russia to the world market, rather than via the southerly route.
      Azerbaijan has nevertheless succeeded in maintaining good relations with Russia.
     
The impact of the crisis in the Caucasus, and the higher profile of Russia that emerged as a result will be analysed for a good while to come.
      Already now it is clear that Russian self-confidence has grown to new dimensions as a result of the Georgian operation.
      The actions of Western countries have boosted Russia’s sense of strength.
      Georgia got little more than sympathy from the West, and some verbal condemnation of Russia.
      Putin and his friends also know that the threshold of Western Europe - dependent on energy from Russia - to enact stronger measures will continue to be high.
     
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 24.8.2008

More on this subject:
 COMMENTARY: Finland, Russia, and NATO

Previously in HS International Edition:
  COMMENTARY: Hasty predictions of big changes (20.8.2008)
  Vanhanen: South Ossetia crisis will affect next national defence report (19.8.2008)
  Georgia: Stubb’s marathon sprint (17.8.2008)