Russia's new foreign policy
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By Erkki Pennanen
Talk of “Russia’s new foreign policy” may sound rather odd, and at least somewhat hastily concocted, if it is seen exclusively in association with the recent crisis in the Caucasus.
In fact the change in Russian foreign policy is not being talked about only in the West but also in Russia itself - and of course in an entirely different manner.
Above all, it seems to be a subject close to the heart of Russia’s President, Dmitri Medvedev.
Medvedev and his predecessor Vladimir Putin, who has now moved over to the Prime Minister’s office, have appeared with due diligence for interviews with Western media outlets and have explained at length their ideas in the company of well-known Russia-watchers and journalists.
As is his wont, Putin has used stronger and more direct language than Medvedev. It is neverthless hard to find actual differences in viewpoint - let alone political line - between the two men.
Outside of Russia itself, the feeling has been that the country's military action in connection with the short war in Georgia obliges the world to reconsider Russia’s policies.
In the opinion of Medvedev and Putin, too, the crisis in the Caucasus has changed a good many things and has forced Russia to reach new conclusions.
According to Medvedev, it is high time to shrug off the illusion that the world’s present security system is an equitable one and to take account of the relative strengths and balance of power of the central players, the great powers.
Translated into words of few syllables, the Moscow leadership believes that Russia has left its weakness of the 1990s behind it and that it is time the United States and other superpowers wised up to this.
Russia has to be listened to, and it must be given a position commensurate with its status in the European and global security architecture.
This architecture cannot be built around an organisation such as NATO, led by just one superpower, the United States.
Russia's new foreign policy comes down to five central tenets as expressed in Medvedev’s interviews:
1) Russia recognises the principles of international law as a framework for relations between sovereign states.
2) Russia does not accept the concept of a unipolar world and a world order in which one state makes all the decisions.
3) Russia has no intention of isolating itself or of seeking an antagonistic position with any state.
4) It is important for Russia to protect the life and dignity of its citizens, extending also to those outside the country’s own borders.
5) Russia sees areas outside its own borders in which it has its own special interests to uphold.
Of these basic principles, numbers four and five are primarily the ones that sound shocking in their forthrightness.
The fourth on the list would appear to be giving Russia the right - in the name of defending its own citizens - to attack even the territory of a sovereign foreign power, as happened in the case of the war with Georgia.
Russia here cites the example set by the United States and other great powers.
Although there is no sense in our exaggerating the frightening vistas opened up by the exercise of this right, its elevation to such a prominent position in this way is undoubtedly great power politics in the raw.
And so is talk of zones in which Russia has its own special interests to maintain.
In his meetings with Western Russia experts, Medvedev gave the assurance that Russia was not looking to take for itself areas outside its borders, nor was it drawing lines on a map to denote its own spheres of influence.
At the same time, Medvedev nevertheless noted that there was nothing shameful about stating candidly that as a superpower Russia has certain regional interests it wishes to keep an eye on.
Medvedev did not set about defining these areas, nor did he limit their scope, for example to former Soviet republics.
In his very vague descriptions he seemed to be including at least all of the countries on Russia’s historical margins and her neighbours - regardless of whether they belonged to some alliances or organisations or not.
Finland is without doubt in this category.
Medvedev has sketched out Russia’s “special interests” in a somewhat roundabout fashion.
He attempts to give them a purely positive significance in the style of: 'Russia wants to develop with these countries good neighbourly relations that are of mutual benefit in all respects' and 'This will ensure a peaceful atmosphere on Russia’s borders'.
These countries would therefore be buffer zones, as seen from the perspective of Russian security.
Russia wanted to make it clear in Georgia that it no longer intends to look on idle and powerless as NATO steadily expands its reach on the country’s southern flank.
Russia henceforth regards its neighbours as belonging to a zone where it has special interests to watch over.
Geopolitics and "sphere of influence" thinking are firmly back in the frame in Russian foreign policy.
Russia may not be able to prevent NATO expansion or, more particuarly, to frighten the United States.
Nevertheless, it is looking to warn NATO’s European members that the political consequences of enlargement are going to be more serious than they have been up to now.
Russia sees the United States in the background to the events in Georgia.
Relations between Washington and Moscow have grown frostier than for quite some time - according to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice things are now at the worst ebb since 1991.
Russia is trying to bank on the fact that Germany, France, and many other NATO member-countries will understand the significance of the stakes in play.
The active presence of Medvedev and Putin through the media speaks of the Russian leadership’s need to explain its foreign policy to the West and to prevent relations with Western Europe from worsening.
After the initial hiatus, Russia agreed to allow specifically the European Union a key role in the cleaning-up operations after the Caucasus crisis.
Russia is just as dependent on cooperation with the EU as the Union is dependent on Russian energy.
In the events of the past weeks, President Medvedev has had a chance to show his determination, and in so doing he has bolstered his own standing in the eyes of the Russians, even if most believe Putin still to be the country’s real leader. Time is working on behalf of a strengthening of Medvedev’s position.
On the other hand, Medvedev’s advance billing as a liberal who upholds Western values took a serious knock in the West over the war in Georgia.
Even Putin himself has publicly lamented this, blaming Georgia for the perceived loss of esteem.
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 28.9.2008
ERKKI PENNANEN / Helsingin Sanomat
erkki.pennanen@hs.fi
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| 30.9.2008 - THIS WEEK |
 Russia's new foreign policy |
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