The precarious lot of the stowaway
COLUMN
Erkki Tuomioja
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Risto Volanen
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Alexander Stubb
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Pentti Sadeniemi
Just as everyone had settled down to the prospect of warming the feelings between the United States and Europe, Germany’s Chancellor cooled things down by reminding us that real rapprochement requires hard work, and that the necessary tools are lacking.
In the view of Gerhard Schröder, NATO has not been used in recent years for strategic negotiations. Also, the dialogue between the United States and the European Union does not take account of the importance of the EU, or of the new requirements of cooperation. Therefore, structural corrections are needed.
The Chancellor provoked indignation, but he was not wrong. Both the EU and NATO are living institutions, but they both are in the midst of an upheaval.
NATO was created as a single-cause movement led by a single country, and the mission it has remains in a way, even after losing its main cause - the Cold War. It is a security alliance among nation-states, with the role of coordinating relations between the only superpower - the United States - and all the others. Its value as a forum has declined, mainly because the United States has lacked the patience and the will to use it right.
The EU would like to be an equal partner with the United States. The value of the EU has increased rather slowly, mainly because the large member states - Germany among them - have preferred to act outside of its structure in foreign policy matters.
Therefore, repairs are needed. Transatlantic cooperation is, in principle, of irreplaceable importance, and transatlantic bickering serves no purpose. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently reaffirmed the support of her government for closer unification of the EU. President George W. Bush will soon arrive in Brussels to reaffirm what she had said.
Now it is high time for Europeans to find the lines of their own policies. Harmony will certainly not be achieved, but clarity would already be something of a victory.
For the part of Finland, which is admittedly a small part, but nevertheless important for us, the requirement is the same. Even after the government’s defence policy report, and a few speeches and articles, the clarity of the country’s national leadership has not been the best possible.
One matter has been explained. Militarily non-allied status does not, in the words of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, "depict Finland’s foreign policy line: it only describes our line on defence, and nothing else. We are not a member of a military alliance. Full stop."
So be it, then. Over time it is useless to argue over two words. However, the next question will probably continue to annoy those who bother to pose such a question: Why aren’t we members?
Nearly all other EU countries are, and a place in NATO would significantly clarify our position. No matter what Schröder said, NATO is also a place where it is possible to nurture the relationship with the United States.
There is a frequently-heard response, which Foreign Ministry official Risto Volanen repeated in his recent op-ed article (Helsingin Sanomat 9.2.): "We do not have a security deficit".
Please don’t bother. One can certainly defend the claim that Finland would be safer outside NATO than inside, but there is no defending a ridiculous assertion. Even if the deficit were not visible today, it can appear tomorrow. If it appears tomorrow, it will have existed already today. No point in speaking nonsense again and again.
The answer cannot be what Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja wrote on "Realpolitik" on his web site. "Could it be, for instance, that we would have Finnish soldiers under US command in the forces of the coalition in Iraq?" No such decision has been demanded, or made in NATO.
The answer also cannot be that the transatlantic relationship and the US presence in Europe would not be considered valuable in Finland; assurances to the contrary are a permanent fixture of official statements. Even in its security policy report, the government confirms that "Finland considers a strong transatlantic relationship to be important both for Europe and for international security".
Volanen writes in his piece: "The commitment of the United States to the security of the Baltic States, through NATO, creates basic stability in our nearby environment, which is, in the deepest sense, in the interest of Finland, Sweden, the Baltic Countries, the EU, and also that of Russia."
Still, he does not want Finland to become involved; after taking support for his arguments from the history that preceded NATO enlargement, Volanen suggests that it would be wisest for us to stay away from Baltic security issues, and consequently, from NATO as well.
As MEP Alexander Stubb pointed out soon after that (HS 12.2.), this kind of logic would quite clearly turn Finland into a security policy freeloader.
There have been other such countries. One can even understand a small country, if it seeks to maximise security with a minimum of obligation.
Sometimes such a situation is tolerated, if the freeloader is able to give something in return for the free protection that it enjoys. Iceland made it through the Cold War in NATO without an army of its own, but it was able to provide the alliance with its strategic base at Keflavik.
Finland is not in such a position. Naturally we can stay under the presumed cover, if we expect nothing from the others. In reality, however, we do have expectations. In the EU, Finland is committed to common policy all the way up to the basics of defence, and the great majority of EU members are in NATO. For us, support given in a crisis should inevitably amount to support from NATO.
Thus, debate should be continued, both concerning NATO and the impression of freeloading, which our position as a member of the EU but outside NATO will not let us avert. Once that impression has been made, denying it in Helsinki benefits nobody.
It is not a role for which the state can win much appreciation. In addition, a stowaway always takes the risk of confronting a ticket inspector, who will ask to see a ticket, and tell the unticketed passenger to get off. In security policy, that could be a very cold experience.
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 16.2.2005
PENTTI SADENIEMI / Helsingin Sanomat
pentti.sadeniemi@hs.fi
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| 22.2.2005 - THIS WEEK |
 The precarious lot of the stowaway |
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