Courting blessings from the Highest
History of Paasikivi Society immerses reader in jungle of policy lines
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By Jukka Tarkka
All Finns are familiar with this club of big boys, where decisions on the affairs of the country were decided, and where the blessings of the Highest were secured for those decisions.
Perhaps the Paasikivi Society really is like that. A new book on the history of the Paasikivi Society, by Professor Osmo Apunen, shows that it was also, and primarily, something very different.
In the development of the Paasikivi Society there are many levels and policy lines. They give rise to such a large number of combinations and subtleties that this book, which goes into fine detail to explain all of this, at first inspires and later confuses the reader with its abundance of material.
The first, and greatest, major policy line question arises already at the very beginning. What really was the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, which this noble order of knights was set up to defend?
President J.K. Paasikivi spent the greater part of his long career following a different line from the one that is called the Paasikivi Line.
During his first term in office, President Urho Kekkonen was such a weak president that he was not able to pursue a "Kekkonen Line". A little bit later he was so strong, that by pursuing the Kekkonen Line he overcame the Paasikivi Line.
The Paasikivi Society defended a policy that deviated from the Paasikivi Line and identified with Kekkonen. Ultimately it did not matter if Kekkonen followed the Paasikivi Line at all. The line bore the names of two presidents, but the society that supported it carried only one. All nuances fit within the framework.
The Paasikivi Line involved reluctant acquiescence to cooperating with the Soviet Union. All other options had already been tried, and experience hardly encouraged Finland to stay that particular course.
The policy line of Kekkonen's first two terms as President was neither Paasikivi-esque reluctance, or passive observation. It sought evidence of cooperation and trust, sometimes to the point of brinkmanship.
In the last decade of the Kekkonen period, the original starting points of the policy line grew stronger. The external face of the policy was downright saccharine, but in content it constituted self-defence with a cautious approach reminiscent of Paasikivi.
As President, Paasikivi had to operate in a situation in which it was absolutely necessary to think about the Soviet Union and nothing else.
Toward the end of the Kekkonen period, the Soviet Union was getting so shaky that support was needed from elsewhere, and consequently, it was necessary to think of matters other than the Soviet Union.
The Paasikivi Society supported everything that Kekkonen did. When it spoke of Paasikivi, it meant Kekkonen. The sharp profile arising from his initiatives was evened out by creating the impression that no matter what happened, the Paasikivi Line was always being followed.
The message given by the society was extremely political, but it openly engaged in politics only once; in the Presidential elections of 1978 it was the centre of the Kekkonen re-election campaign, after which it began to lose its position.
The predominant impression that people have of the Paasikivi Society is so crystal-clear that Apunen's reader does not expect to find the jungle of policy lines into which the author hacks the path of his thinking. The book forces the reader to make an effort, and as such, makes for very healthy reading on the psychological level.
Apunen creates a multi-level structure, but keeps close rein on the ties that hold it together. The book is heavy and difficult to read, but it is not the historian's fault if history is complicated.
Apunen has a slight tendency toward theorisation in his interpretations of history. His favourite theory is that of "operation umbilical cord", with which Kekkonen began to implement the integration with the West right after the so-called "night frost period" of cool relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1950s.
In the same package he also wrapped the long-term model for coalition governments, as well as his own possibilities for holding on to the office of President.
All of this was to have been carried out by steering more toward the political right, without identifying too much with the right-wing parties, or excessively annoying the left. Ultimately it could be carried out in the early 1970s only by seeking support from the Social Democratic Party, isolating the SDP from the National Coalition Party.
A President with a background in the political centre promoted his policy programme, which was portrayed as right-wing, with the help of the Social Democrats.
For Kekkonen, umbilical cord was a political operation. Apunen uses it as a theoretical model. However, in that implementation, the cord gets so many kinks and knots that it hardly makes for easier understanding of the matter.
The Paasikivi Society is a difficult topic for research. It is a centre of political proclamation, but it mainly remained in the background. Its position in society was based on one single idea.
Apunen deepens the image by quoting speeches made at meetings of the Society over the decades, as well as articles published in connection with it, and by juxtaposing them with the theoretical models that he builds in the policy jungle.
The method works well in reporting on the early phases of the society. It is quite a classy description of the political and intellectual landscape of the second half of the 1950s.
Apunen later has to condense his description into a continuum of speech summaries. Visualising the background ends up being thinner than in the early sections. Following the main thread of the narrative is very demanding on the reader.
The Paasikivi Society seeks a certain defined ideal state in the unique historical situation. The traces of this attitude began to emerge quite well when the Soviet era and Finland's psychological defensiveness began to be a thing of the past.
Since the 1990s quite a few of the most visible figures of the golden age of the Paasikivi Society have come out against great new decisions of the kind that were the core of the life's work of Kekkonen. For them, the line meant keeping things the same as they were before, rather than any psychological mobility.
Leading National Coalition Party figure Harri Holkeri, who became Chairman of the Paasikivi Society in the late 1990s, made a famous speech at the beginning of the decade about squaring a circle, which used neutrality to nearly stifle the idea of the European Union.
The founder of the Paasikivi Society, and the main powerful figure behind it, Jan Magnus Jansson and its former deputy chairman Keijo Korhonen, led the movement opposing Finnish membership in the EU.
Mauno Koivisto, a long-term member of the group's delegate council, opposes NATO membership.
Research is at its best when it succeeds in dissecting a historical phenomenon into constituent parts and in showing that the whole is greater than the sum of those parts. The trend seems to be the opposite in the history of the Paasikivi Society.
When its conceptual structural factors are first dismantled, they no longer get any more meaning from the whole from whence they came. The parts are more significant than the whole.
According to conventional political wisdom, phenomena such as the Paasikivi Society should not even exist. However, this never occurred to its founders and active members, and so the society was born, and it continues to operate. Writing a thorough history of such a curious phenomenon is well worth the effort.
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 12.5.2005
Jukka Tarkka is a political scientist and occasional columnist.
All Finns are familiar with this club of big boys, where decisions on the affairs of the country were decided, and where the blessings of the Highest were secured for those decisions.
Perhaps the Paasikivi Society really is like that. A new book on the history of the Paasikivi Society, by Professor Osmo Apunen, shows that it was also, and primarily, something very different.
In the development of the Paasikivi Society there are many levels and policy lines. They give rise to such a large number of combinations and subtleties that this book, which goes into fine detail to explain all of this, at first inspires and later confuses the reader with its abundance of material.
The first, and greatest, major policy line question arises already at the very beginning. What really was the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, which this noble order of knights was set up to defend?
President J.K. Paasikivi spent the greater part of his long career following a different line from the one that is called the Paasikivi Line.
During his first term in office, President Urho Kekkonen was such a weak president that he was not able to pursue a "Kekkonen Line". A little bit later he was so strong, that by pursuing the Kekkonen Line he overcame the Paasikivi Line.
The Paasikivi Society defended a policy that deviated from the Paasikivi Line and identified with Kekkonen. Ultimately it did not matter if Kekkonen followed the Paasikivi Line at all. The line bore the names of two presidents, but the society that supported it carried only one. All nuances fit within the framework.
The Paasikivi Line involved reluctant acquiescence to cooperating with the Soviet Union. All other options had already been tried, and experience hardly encouraged Finland to stay that particular course.
The policy line of Kekkonen's first two terms as President was neither Paasikivi-esque reluctance, or passive observation. It sought evidence of cooperation and trust, sometimes to the point of brinkmanship.
In the last decade of the Kekkonen period, the original starting points of the policy line grew stronger. The external face of the policy was downright saccharine, but in content it constituted self-defence with a cautious approach reminiscent of Paasikivi.
As President, Paasikivi had to operate in a situation in which it was absolutely necessary to think about the Soviet Union and nothing else.
Toward the end of the Kekkonen period, the Soviet Union was getting so shaky that support was needed from elsewhere, and consequently, it was necessary to think of matters other than the Soviet Union.
The Paasikivi Society supported everything that Kekkonen did. When it spoke of Paasikivi, it meant Kekkonen. The sharp profile arising from his initiatives was evened out by creating the impression that no matter what happened, the Paasikivi Line was always being followed.
The message given by the society was extremely political, but it openly engaged in politics only once; in the Presidential elections of 1978 it was the centre of the Kekkonen re-election campaign, after which it began to lose its position.
The predominant impression that people have of the Paasikivi Society is so crystal-clear that Apunen's reader does not expect to find the jungle of policy lines into which the author hacks the path of his thinking. The book forces the reader to make an effort, and as such, makes for very healthy reading on the psychological level.
Apunen creates a multi-level structure, but keeps close rein on the ties that hold it together. The book is heavy and difficult to read, but it is not the historian's fault if history is complicated.
Apunen has a slight tendency toward theorisation in his interpretations of history. His favourite theory is that of "operation umbilical cord", with which Kekkonen began to implement the integration with the West right after the so-called "night frost period" of cool relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1950s.
In the same package he also wrapped the long-term model for coalition governments, as well as his own possibilities for holding on to the office of President.
All of this was to have been carried out by steering more toward the political right, without identifying too much with the right-wing parties, or excessively annoying the left. Ultimately it could be carried out in the early 1970s only by seeking support from the Social Democratic Party, isolating the SDP from the National Coalition Party.
A President with a background in the political centre promoted his policy programme, which was portrayed as right-wing, with the help of the Social Democrats.
For Kekkonen, umbilical cord was a political operation. Apunen uses it as a theoretical model. However, in that implementation, the cord gets so many kinks and knots that it hardly makes for easier understanding of the matter.
The Paasikivi Society is a difficult topic for research. It is a centre of political proclamation, but it mainly remained in the background. Its position in society was based on one single idea.
Apunen deepens the image by quoting speeches made at meetings of the Society over the decades, as well as articles published in connection with it, and by juxtaposing them with the theoretical models that he builds in the policy jungle.
The method works well in reporting on the early phases of the society. It is quite a classy description of the political and intellectual landscape of the second half of the 1950s.
Apunen later has to condense his description into a continuum of speech summaries. Visualising the background ends up being thinner than in the early sections. Following the main thread of the narrative is very demanding on the reader.
The Paasikivi Society seeks a certain defined ideal state in the unique historical situation. The traces of this attitude began to emerge quite well when the Soviet era and Finland's psychological defensiveness began to be a thing of the past.
Since the 1990s quite a few of the most visible figures of the golden age of the Paasikivi Society have come out against great new decisions of the kind that were the core of the life's work of Kekkonen. For them, the line meant keeping things the same as they were before, rather than any psychological mobility.
Leading National Coalition Party figure Harri Holkeri, who became Chairman of the Paasikivi Society in the late 1990s, made a famous speech at the beginning of the decade about squaring a circle, which used neutrality to nearly stifle the idea of the European Union.
The founder of the Paasikivi Society, and the main powerful figure behind it, Jan Magnus Jansson and its former deputy chairman Keijo Korhonen, led the movement opposing Finnish membership in the EU.
Mauno Koivisto, a long-term member of the group's delegate council, opposes NATO membership.
Research is at its best when it succeeds in dissecting a historical phenomenon into constituent parts and in showing that the whole is greater than the sum of those parts. The trend seems to be the opposite in the history of the Paasikivi Society.
When its conceptual structural factors are first dismantled, they no longer get any more meaning from the whole from whence they came. The parts are more significant than the whole.
According to conventional political wisdom, phenomena such as the Paasikivi Society should not even exist. However, this never occurred to its founders and active members, and so the society was born, and it continues to operate. Writing a thorough history of such a curious phenomenon is well worth the effort.
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 12.5.2005
Jukka Tarkka is a political scientist and occasional columnist.
Helsingin Sanomat