Russia and the difficult game of international public relations
COLUMN
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By Olli Kivinen
The Baltic States have every reason to be pleased that Russia continued to snarl at them even during the celebrations of Victory Day. The Balts got more positive publicity from different parts of the world than at any previous time, including the period of the restoration of their independence in the early 1990s. At that time many dramatic turns of events were taking place in Europe, which partly overshadowed the events in the Baltic States.
Little is known around the world about the history or reality of the Baltic States, or of Finland. Now the situation is better from their point of view; membership in NATO and the EU combined with the flurry of publicity sparked by Moscow have efficiently spread information about the position of the Baltic States.
Russia’s actions offer a first-class lesson on the impact that clumsy propaganda arising from internal pressure can have. Russia managed to turn part of the victory celebration that it had declared to be sacred into criticism that hurt itself.
The reason was simple: the propaganda speeches of Stalin that were dug up out of the trash barrel of history.
Unfounded claims that the Baltic countries voluntarily joined the Soviet Union, and denying that there was a Soviet occupation, by claiming that it was based on treaties were so bizarre as to be ridiculous. Treaties signed at gunpoint are of no value.
At the same time attention was focused on certain matters related to the Second World War that Russia does not want to talk about. These include the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between the dictatorships led by Stalin and Hitler, the start of the war with the division of Poland, the attempt to capture Finland, and naturally the occupation of the Baltic States.
Deepening the propaganda defeat was that Russia had a very good possibility to get positive publicity on the 60th anniversary of the victory against Germany. The Russians are quite right when they say that people in the West are not sufficiently aware of the input and the suffering of Russia in the war against the Nazis.
More Russian citizens died in the war than those of the other countries taking part in the war combined. The number of Russian dead was 27 million, and other types of suffering were on the same scale. This reality brought plenty of sympathy now as well, but bickering about the past eroded part of it.
The suffering of the Russian people was increased by the killing and deportation of millions upon millions of people in Stalin’s obsessive persecutions and artificial famines. The same trend continued for years after the war, although not nearly as horrendously as before the war.
Russia’s motives to snap at the Balts are clear. It is difficult for all former great powers to admit to the darker sides of their past. In fact, the only exception to this is Germany, where taking control of the past has been taken truly seriously.
Another reason for Russia’s unwillingness to concede the occupation comes from the fear that such an admission could lead to demands for compensation for past suffering at a time when such demands are increasingly common.
The series of events also underscores how difficult publicity management is, especially in countries with no tradition of free media. There is undoubtedly genuine confusion among Russia’s leadership, caused by the unpredictability of the dissemination of information that reaches every corner of the world in real time.
At the same time it has been seen how the shrinking of the information world makes it more difficult to talk about difficult matters to one’s own people and to foreigners at the same time.
Speeches which are credible, and which inspire a common spirit will also often bring about strong reactions in both neighbours, and in more distant countries.
Denying the reality of the past inflicts the greatest damage on the countries that do so.
The contradictory messages clearly make Russia’s position more difficult. Talk of building democracy and belonging to the European family on the one hand, and falsifying the past on the other, show a sharp contradiction, which is deepened by the incessantly brutal nature of the war in Chechnya.
The relationship with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact is a concrete source of suspicion and fear.
During the time of Mikhail Gorbachov the Soviet Union condemned the treaty, but Russia has not done the same. On the contrary, President Vladimir Putin recently downplayed the pact and its consequences, saying that it was an action with which Russia sought to secure its interests and security on its western borders.
Russia’s Ambassador to Finland, Vladimir Grinin wrote on the op-ed page of Helsingin Sanomat (May 9th, 2005) that the Soviet Union was "forced" to sign its agreement with Germany. At the same time he tried to completely circumvent the Soviet attack on Finland, and the Winter War.
It is difficult to see how Russia’s actions toward the Baltic States and the reactions they have caused would help the Russian minorities in those countries, which Russia is constantly concerned about. One might rather say that the policies of the Baltic countries are understood around the world much better than before, and Russia’s actions are followed much more closely and with more suspicion.
Lashing out at the Baltics has also weakened Russia’s relations with the United States and the EU. The important visit to Latvia of President George Bush and his strong support for the Baltic countries took place because Russia’s statements had placed domestic pressure on Bush and forced him to clear the road to Moscow by giving strong support to the Balts.
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 17.5.2005
The Baltic States have every reason to be pleased that Russia continued to snarl at them even during the celebrations of Victory Day. The Balts got more positive publicity from different parts of the world than at any previous time, including the period of the restoration of their independence in the early 1990s. At that time many dramatic turns of events were taking place in Europe, which partly overshadowed the events in the Baltic States.
Little is known around the world about the history or reality of the Baltic States, or of Finland. Now the situation is better from their point of view; membership in NATO and the EU combined with the flurry of publicity sparked by Moscow have efficiently spread information about the position of the Baltic States.
Russia’s actions offer a first-class lesson on the impact that clumsy propaganda arising from internal pressure can have. Russia managed to turn part of the victory celebration that it had declared to be sacred into criticism that hurt itself.
The reason was simple: the propaganda speeches of Stalin that were dug up out of the trash barrel of history.
Unfounded claims that the Baltic countries voluntarily joined the Soviet Union, and denying that there was a Soviet occupation, by claiming that it was based on treaties were so bizarre as to be ridiculous. Treaties signed at gunpoint are of no value.
At the same time attention was focused on certain matters related to the Second World War that Russia does not want to talk about. These include the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between the dictatorships led by Stalin and Hitler, the start of the war with the division of Poland, the attempt to capture Finland, and naturally the occupation of the Baltic States.
Deepening the propaganda defeat was that Russia had a very good possibility to get positive publicity on the 60th anniversary of the victory against Germany. The Russians are quite right when they say that people in the West are not sufficiently aware of the input and the suffering of Russia in the war against the Nazis.
More Russian citizens died in the war than those of the other countries taking part in the war combined. The number of Russian dead was 27 million, and other types of suffering were on the same scale. This reality brought plenty of sympathy now as well, but bickering about the past eroded part of it.
The suffering of the Russian people was increased by the killing and deportation of millions upon millions of people in Stalin’s obsessive persecutions and artificial famines. The same trend continued for years after the war, although not nearly as horrendously as before the war.
Russia’s motives to snap at the Balts are clear. It is difficult for all former great powers to admit to the darker sides of their past. In fact, the only exception to this is Germany, where taking control of the past has been taken truly seriously.
Another reason for Russia’s unwillingness to concede the occupation comes from the fear that such an admission could lead to demands for compensation for past suffering at a time when such demands are increasingly common.
The series of events also underscores how difficult publicity management is, especially in countries with no tradition of free media. There is undoubtedly genuine confusion among Russia’s leadership, caused by the unpredictability of the dissemination of information that reaches every corner of the world in real time.
At the same time it has been seen how the shrinking of the information world makes it more difficult to talk about difficult matters to one’s own people and to foreigners at the same time.
Speeches which are credible, and which inspire a common spirit will also often bring about strong reactions in both neighbours, and in more distant countries.
Denying the reality of the past inflicts the greatest damage on the countries that do so.
The contradictory messages clearly make Russia’s position more difficult. Talk of building democracy and belonging to the European family on the one hand, and falsifying the past on the other, show a sharp contradiction, which is deepened by the incessantly brutal nature of the war in Chechnya.
The relationship with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact is a concrete source of suspicion and fear.
During the time of Mikhail Gorbachov the Soviet Union condemned the treaty, but Russia has not done the same. On the contrary, President Vladimir Putin recently downplayed the pact and its consequences, saying that it was an action with which Russia sought to secure its interests and security on its western borders.
Russia’s Ambassador to Finland, Vladimir Grinin wrote on the op-ed page of Helsingin Sanomat (May 9th, 2005) that the Soviet Union was "forced" to sign its agreement with Germany. At the same time he tried to completely circumvent the Soviet attack on Finland, and the Winter War.
It is difficult to see how Russia’s actions toward the Baltic States and the reactions they have caused would help the Russian minorities in those countries, which Russia is constantly concerned about. One might rather say that the policies of the Baltic countries are understood around the world much better than before, and Russia’s actions are followed much more closely and with more suspicion.
Lashing out at the Baltics has also weakened Russia’s relations with the United States and the EU. The important visit to Latvia of President George Bush and his strong support for the Baltic countries took place because Russia’s statements had placed domestic pressure on Bush and forced him to clear the road to Moscow by giving strong support to the Balts.
Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 17.5.2005
OLLI KIVINEN / Helsingin Sanomat
okivinen@kolumbus.fi